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”Mam, Dad and the child are going to a lake 
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What is it that criticism 
is to criticize?
– From Pessac to architecturology, a (critical) history of an object of research
W
hen dealing with archi-
tecture – visible pheno- 
menon th-
rough architectural objects – we might 
tend to consider that any attempt to have knowledge 
of it must depend at the outset on observation. Archi-
tecturology, whose project to elaborate a knowledge 
base focused on the processes of conception, as oppo-
sed to the objects themselves once designed,1 raises 
not only the problem of observing phenomena that are 
not observable directly (the processes of conception), 
but it leads also to questions concerning the nature 
of and the stakes involved in the observation which 
takes into account such a project.2 Elsewhere, we suc-
ceeded in distinguishing two radically opposed attitu-
des as regards the experimental act through which all 
theoretical work must pass and which then associates 
reasoning and observation. The first attitude invol-
ves putting under the test of experience, models which 
are constructed theoretically without any concern for 
the experimental aspect, whereas the second atti-
tude concentrates on producing concepts based on 
a reality that is observed.3 The voluntarily theoretical 
character of architecturology – we shall come back to 
this later – would place it among the first approaches. 
Insofar as the second is concerned it elaborates pro-
positions whose status can necessarily shift from the 
theoretical to the critical.
But what are we to understand by criticism? If we 
establish implicitly a relationship with something that 
is theoretical by nature must we not then differentiate 
architectural criticism – which relates to works – from 
that which, for lack of a better word, we would qua-
lify as critical studies on questions or objects possibly 
relating to theoretical problems? And how can those 
problems be raised without entering» too much into 
the theoretical work? Basically, the question could be: 
What is it that criticism is to criticize? And such is the 
question which through a brief historical overview of 
an object of research – architecturology – we would 
like to, if not treat, at least examine in terms of its pos-
sible connections with the work of theoretical produc-
tion itself.
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1. ARCHITECTUROLOGY
With architecturology, a different law governing the 
principle of observation is introduced. Whenever it 
is no longer a question of studying objects but rather 
the processes of conception of objects, we are enjoined 
to put forward the hypothesis of architecturology as 
simulation4 of the processes of conception of archi-
tecture. The reason for doing so is the impossibility of 
perceiving this process, whereas a building can be ob-
served. This hypothesis of simulation is based on the 
theoretical model constituted by the interplay model/ 
scale.5 This model permits a hypothetical account of 
the architect’s work in its multiple aspects, as oppo-
sed to an account whose starting point is the analy-
tic breakdown of tasks or of particular phases of the 
design process. In the architecturological simulation 
of architectural design, this activity is apprehended 
as a totality. This leads to envisaging experimentation 
from the side of the model and no longer from the side 
of the analytic partition which, we know, runs counter to 
the modelling approach.6 That being said, it is highly 
unlikely that in the field of architecturology the objects 
of study of experimentation will allow, as in the physical 
sciences, for subdivision into parts, segments, or sums 
of parts or of segments; there is also little probability 
that the totalities turn out to be, as in biology, living 
wholes, As with the living, it may be necessary to con-
tinuously regroup hypothetical totalities into a more 
vast entity of which they are part; but, in contrast to the 
living,the organic individuality of this vaster entity will 
be advanced, if it must be, only as a metaphor or, more 
radically, as a systemic totality. On the other hand, if 
architecturology is to expose the nature and specific 
details of given totalities, it will be dependent on the 
conceptual advances it realises and on the theoretical 
consolidation itself that it will have accomplished.
 In addition to the problem – a basic one – on 
the kind of totalities likely to be studied, the distinc-
tion proposed above between analytic and model ge-
nerating approaches must be evaluated in the light 
of another consequence concerning the hypotheses 
on an architecturology as simulation. Since architectu-
rology deals with the cognitive process of architectural 
design – as opposed to architectural buildings, i.e. the 
concrete objects –, it raises the problem of the kind 
of reality that can thus be studied. And then, how to 
avoid the temptation to apply the experimentation 
– if experimentation there must be – to the architectu-
ral objects when architecturology, does not deal with 
them directly, but with their conception? The question 
raised here refers back to the epistemological meaning 
of experimentation: namely, architecturological... or ar-
chitectural?
2. Architecturologie and... architecture
Let us take the example of the Frugès neighbourhood 
in Pessac. For many, and more particularly for the 
primary actors involved in the operation, the neigh-
bourhood has experimental value. Thus Frugès gives 
Le Corbusier full freedom to put into practice his theo-
ries taking them to their logical conclusion. Although 
the word to experiment is not mentioned, the incite-
ment to put into practice refers us back to the idea of 
experiment as a validation test. For the experimental 
character will be attributed to the resultant material 
object only if the latter can be realized. However, to be 
validated, the experiment – whether technical or ar-
chitectural – presupposes not only such a realization, 
but also the tools and means to question and interpret 
it. But we see that in response to Frugès’ request that 
Pessac be a laboratory, Le Corbusier states at the inau-
guration of the Quartiers Modernes Frugès that Pessac 
was a laboratory. The experimental idea concludes with 
the construction site, with the realization of the work. 
The laboratory exists thanks to its mere material pre-
sence.
In this relationship between theory and practical 
application we encounter the problem of a theoretical 
activity which in the field of architecture is characte-
rized by its difficulty in constructing questions7. Per-
haps because of such difficulty, this theoretical activity, 
faced with calls to use the imagination, seduction, and 
the unique (but from a different perspective if compa-
red with the requirements of the scientific field, i.e. in 
providing the proof of the existence of a phenomenon 
or testing a generality), feels more at ease than those 
coming from the normal scientific fields.8
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Lastly, in this disticntion between two ideas of the-
ory, – one which questions and is questioned and the 
other which is elaborated as a thesis to be endorsed or 
tested in reality – we might find an example in Thierry 
Gaudin’s work on the distinction between research 
and innovation.9 To Gaudin research aims at producing 
knowledge whereas innovation aims at putting forth 
ideas or developments whose consequences are asse-
sed in relation to a... market that may be technological, 
architectural or... in criticism.
Nevertheless the case at Pessac, as a result of 
transformations approaching aberration,10 leads also 
to questions of a theoretical nature. But then it be-
comes necessary to modify the point of view of the 
observation11 – can we say the epistemological mea-
ning? From the architectural to the architecturological, 
the Pessac laboratory transforms itself and provides 
the impetus for intellectual experiments which can po-
tentially range among the premises of an architecturo-
logy.12 From a concrete laboratory, Pessac becomes an 
experiment of thought.
3. Project within knowledge and within architecture
Pessac becomes a potential phenomenon in the full 
meaning of the term. Although not functioning in the 
same way as Denis Papin’s kettle, which provides through 
a vivid shortcut, concrete evidence of the idea of trans-
formation in energy (from heat to mechanical), Pessac 
does act in that manner, allowing empiricists to carry 
out experiments whose theoretical premises may not 
be totally mastered but which are intuitively perceived 
and ultimately result in a major step taken toward that 
form of knowledge. A similar example can be found in 
the manner of empirical medicine which, with Claude 
Bernard, indicates according to G. Canguilhem, 
the tradition of an active medicine, of assistance to the 
ill, not satisfied to limit itself to observation, practicin 
in its efforts to provide treatments, experiments which 
are barely premeditated, hardly analytic or critical, and 
condensed into therapeutic prescriptions whose rela-
tive effectiveness and reliability reject any explanatory 
legitimacy.13
G. Canguilhem adds, that in one sense, «empiricism ta-
kes a first step towards the experimental method with 
the back turned to Hypocratic medecine «. Every single 
word of this last quotation is significant for the study 
carried out on Pessac14 in 1967, since the latter is a first 
step towards architecturology and it is also a step ta-
ken with the back turned to the passive observation 
of architectural objects. The study on Pessac, which is 
no longer merely empirical but as yet not experimen-
tal, chronologically precedes the work carried out on 
the city of Richelieu. This is because, in the meantime, 
the architecturological project constituted itsef; it was 
founded.
The Pessac study was then followed by the study on 
the city of Richelieu15 resulting in the first consideration 
of the central question of architecturology: how does 
the architect give measurements to space? Between 
the two studies the architecturological objective and 
initial hypotheses were described while the problem 
of measurement16 was focused on through the ques-
tion of scale. Thanks to the theoretical argument ad-
vanced in Sur l’espace architectural, we could say that 
from Pessac to Richelieu there is passage from factu-
al empiricism to experimental presumption. As previ-
oulsy stated Pessac was studied in its reality and for its 
reality. Richelieu was studied for its double capacity to 
allow an architecturological development and as an 
analysis of architectural objects. In Richelieu, the ob-
ject of research (the question of scale) is distinguished 
from the subject of the research (the city of Richelieu).
Then came a theoretical work on the question of archi-
tectural integration which, with a more overtly theo-
retical concern, set up the city of Louvain-la-Neuve as 
an object of study for the testing of architecturology’s 
theoretical hypotheses on the question of integra-
tion.17 Only subsequently was it possible to elaborate 
in situ an investigation taking the form of a dialogue 
(shall we say experimental?) between this theoretical 
problem setting of integration and an architectural 
reality.
We have said more overtly experimental in order 
to qualify the this phase of the research undertaken at 
Louvain-la-Neuve. In fact, such a consideration was 
not explicitly present. But a look back at that work 
reveals many symptoms of an implicitly experimen-
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tal ambition. Such as: A) constitution of the object of 
study, Louvain-la-Neuve, on the basis of a theoretical 
investigation of integration and of more specific cases 
referring to distinct hypotheses on the above mentio-
ned development (Bar-le-Duc and Hoëdic Island for 
the morphological and social aspects of integration, B) 
confrontation between theoretical hypotheses and 
observation in the field; C) conclusion on the notion 
of system, consisting of developing three models of 
integration.
The essence of the new work that came out of the 
field work18 presents itself in the form of two texts 
that face each other and are organized alike with the 
same subdivision of titles and sub-titles. However, one 
of the texts refers to the theoretical questions by the 
problem-setting on integration while the other text 
refers to one abstract reality drawn form the reality 
of the city of Louvain-la-Neuve, whose purpose, as an 
ideal situation, is intended less to serve as a reflection 
of a real situation than as a response to the theoreti-
cal questioning confronting it. The intention was not 
to demonstrate the relevance of the theoretical pro-
positions in the field as represented by the city, but, 
instead, to show how these theoretical interrogations 
are expressed, undergo change, or extend themsel-
ves into that reality.
Thus, the work on Pessac, Richelieu, and Louvain-
la-Neuve offers itself as a three-stage process moving 
from the empirical to the experimental. The epistemo-
logical meaning guiding the operation – the develop-
ment of architecturology in this case – modifies the 
conditions and the principles of the latter. Taking up 
terms borrowed from G. Canguilhem we can say that 
we pass on from a «passive» observation to one that is 
«conquering», but conquering as regards architectu-
rology and not architecture.
4. Representation and reality
What are we to understand by «epistemological mea-
ning»? The explanation proposed by G. Canguilhem on 
the history of an experiment will help us to try to clarify 
this question. In spite of its relative length, it is neces-
sary to quote it in full:
In a lesson on muscular contraction, one will define 
the contraction as a change in the form of the muscle 
without a variation on volume, and if necessary one will 
establish the fact through experimentation following a 
technique whose illustrated diagramme is reproduced 
in all science textbooks: an isolated muscle, placed in a jar 
filled with water will contract if put under an electric cur-
rent without variation in the level of the liquid. One will 
be happy to have established a fact. Yet it is an episte-
mological fact that an experimental fact thus taught has 
no biological meaning. That’s how it is and that is that. 
But if we go back to the first biologist who had the idea 
of doing such an experiment, namely, Swammerdam 
(1637–1680), this meaning appears from the start. He 
wanted to establish, in opposition to then existing the-
ories on muscle contraction, that in that occurrence the 
muscle is not increased by any substance. And at the origin 
of those theories which all supposed a tubular or porous 
structure providing a passage through which some flu-
id, spirit, or liquid would reach the muscle, one finds an 
experiment going back to Galen (131–200). It involves 
an experimental fact which passes unchanged through 
centuries of research on the neuro-muscular function: the 
ligature of a nerve paralyses the muscle connected to it. 
We are faced here with an experimental act that is both 
elementary and complete. All things being equal, the 
determinism of a conditionning factor is designated 
by the pressure or absence, intentionally obtained, of 
an artifact whose application supposes on the one hand 
an empirical knowledge – a rather new practice at the 
time of Galen – concerning the fact that the nerves, 
the spinal cord, and the encephalon form a single tract 
whose cavity attracts more attention than the wall; on 
the other hand, that knowledge incorporates a psyc-
hological theory, i.e. metaphysical, according to which 
the command of the animal’s movements reside in the 
brain. In fact, it is the stoïc theory of the hegemonikon 
which draws Galen’s attention to an observation that any 
sacrificer of animals or any surgeon can experience and 
which leads him to institute the experiment of using a 
ligature, thereby concluding that the tonic and clonic 
contraction is brought on by the transfer of pneuma. In 
short, we see our modest and simple laboratory expe-
riment stand out in the background of lasting biological 
meaning because what is really involved here, under the 
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somewhat abstract name of «relational activity», are pro-
blems of posture and locomotion that an animal has to 
deal with in its daily peaceful or dangerous life, in its 
normal or shaken environment.19 
So at the time when it was carried out, Swammerdam’s 
experiment had a biological meaning, i.e. a meaning 
more with respect to knowledge of living matter than 
with respect to the living itself. The reality brought 
into attention by ment, but only in exceptions will 
that reality become an intrinsic factor for the living 
being itself. The experiment exists as such only as re-
gards the questioning that establishes and organizes 
it. This is an essential point for the main concern of ar-
chitecturology, at least to the extent that it implies ne-
ver losing sight of the architecturological signification 
in all experimental settings, even though it may lead us 
away from the concrete reality of architecture.
In other words, any experimental setting which 
would not correspond to an architecturological ques-
tioning or to its hypotheses and which would prevent 
identifying questions or pertinent concepts with respect 
to architecturology would not bear an... architecturo-
logical meaning. Behind the apparent banality of this 
consideration, there emerges the necessity to find 
ourselves at all times within the limits of a project 
of knowledge as opposed to an... architectural project. 
Before, when we spoke about a conquering observa-
tion of higher intensity as regards architecturology 
and not architecture we did not give any further de-
tails. An architectural reality that is put in the spotlight 
will be architecturologically experimental so long as 
it permits widening the scope of architecturological 
questions on architecture, or if it permits the interro-
gation or validation of architecturological concepts or 
hypotheses.
Through the to and fro movement of this expe-
rimental dialogue the resulting architecturological 
meaning would then take at least two directions. The 
first would consist of testing, in an architecturologi-
cally idealized architectural reality, the concepts or 
theoretical hypotheses proposed. The second would 
aim at constituting architecturologically architectural 
observations. This means that it would extend the ar-
chitecturological questioning of architecture or would 
reflect on an already elaborated questioning with a 
view to determining its possible experimental mode.
The first direction raises the problem of elaborating 
an architectural reality that would be architecturo-
logically relevant; the second raises the other problem 
of finding and selecting experiments which would be 
crucial as regards the architecturological questioning.
5. A crucial experiment
For example, in the case of an architectural object 
such as Alvar Aalto’s Nordic Bank building in Helsinki, 
architecturology will not direct its considerations to 
the architectural reality of the building itself (its de-
tails, its style, its urban setting, etc.) but rather to the 
process of conception. Such would be the first change 
of perspective, that architecturology would introduce 
vis-à-vis architecture.20 Furthermore, in its appreciation 
of the process of conception, architecturology will not 
attempt to identify the process Aalto engages concer-
ning this building. No hypothesis will be advanced or 
examined in order to find out how the architect was 
able – supposedly was able – to succeed in designing 
this particular building. Architecturology will have an in-
terest in this building – and particularly this one alone 
from among the immensity of architectural works 
– because it offers the fortune21 of being suitable to be 
«called upon as a possible key to a hypothesis»22. For 
architecturology finds in this building both the possi-
bility of elaborating an architecturological experiment 
and a confirmation in relation to one of its theoretical 
hypotheses.
In this undertaking, however, the architectural rea-
lity of the building will have to become blurred and 
opened up to a new reality, architecturological, which 
constitutes also – in the case of this example – a cru-
cial experiment for its theoretical development.
For a better understanding of the above one must 
articulate somewhat the gist of the architecturologi-
cal proposition.23 Focused on the question of measu-
rement, considered as the ineluctable work through 
which the architect must go while involved in his de-
sign work (he gives and takes measurements) ar-
chitecturology puts forth the hypothesis that archi-
tectural space (resultant) can be considered as a set of 
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syntagma presupposed as relevant (by the architect 
in the course of his work). The notion of relevance re-
fers to the multiplicity of occurrences (successive or 
simultaneous)24 which architecturology calls scale and 
on which an initial empirico-theoretical inventory has 
been established during the work devoted to the city 
of Richelieu.25 Among the scales identified in that work 
was, inter alia, the neighbouring scale, namely, the re-
levance corresponding to the decision by the architect 
to take the neighbourhood into account in an active 
manner during the process of conception. This means 
that the measurement of the space that is being concei-
ved is directly informed by the deliberate taking into 
account (in the course of the architect’s work) of the 
neighbourhood; however, the latter does not induce 
a specific approach in the architect’s integration of the 
information (formal result).
The Nordic Bank building appears, then, as a crucial 
link for confirming the presence of such a theoretical 
relevance – of such a scale – among the set of scales 
which can possibly intervene in the definition of the 
measurements of the architectural object.
The above theoretical confirmation is based on the 
thinking experiment which would consist of imagining 
an inversion, namely a commutation of the building in 
the same environment.
With respect to the hypothesis of the neighbouring 
scale, Alvar Aalto’s building provides a confirmation 
that it is possible to theoretically advance the concrete 
presence of the scale. In the same context, the com-
mutation of the building acts as a thinking experiment 
with important architecturological – as opposed to 
architectural – meaning. In addition, the architecturo-
logical impact of this experiment is confirmed by the 
possibility of repeating it again to with other buildings, 
however much in their design they are limited in relation 
to other scales. Thus, Pei’s Hancock Building in Boston 
can be subjected to the same commutation as it relates 
to the optical scale and with the knowledge that for 
this building, situated in Copley Square, the architect 
deliberately chose a particular perspective by display-
ing the gable instead of the facade.
Without moving deeper into the content of architec-
turological work, we shall simply mention the fact that 
these experiments led to the notion of scaler – distinct 
from scale – for which the neighbouring scaler and the 
optical scaler provide here two illustrations.26
6. For a criticism… that is architectuology!
Since from the outset architecturology focuses its inten-
tions on the problem of measurement, it is clear that it 
is not aiming at some kind of general theory of archi-
tecture or to access the totality of architectural reality. 
But at the same time, this focus forces and compels 
architecturology to identity the crucial questions to 
be examined from the perspective of the problem of 
measurement as well as to supervise rigourously how 
they evolve. Thereafter, the undertaking becomes less 
architectural than scientific and concerns less the sta-
tus of architecturology vis-à-vis architecture27 than the 
identification of those questions deemed to be crucial 
for the knowledge of conception – through a knowled-
ge of the measurement – and the rigour of theoretical 
developments applied to the question of scale.
Architecturology’s relation to architecture or to the 
reality of architectural objects obviously does not cor-
respond to the same order as that of architectural cri-
ticism. In the preceding example, what is analysed by 
architecturology is not the (complex) reality of the ar-
chitectural object (Alvar Aalto’s Nordic Bank building) 
but rather a reality which has been transformed by the 
theoretical hypothesis so that a dialogue can be esta-
blished with it. And what is involved is indeed a dialo-
gue with an architectural reality, even if that reality is 
transformed; here, the Aristotelian, Cartesian and then 
Contean attitude of respect and neutrality to which 
the theory of architecture has adhered is replaced by a 
practice which «manipulates», «stages» reality not for 
the enjoyment of architecture but for a «maximal proxi-
mity in respect of a theoretical description»28.
The constitution of another architectural reality by 
architecturology can, of course, create problems of 
comprehension for architects legitimately concerned 
with a more immediate understanding of reality, or for 
critics of architecture whose mission, according to Bar-
thes, is to produce meaning and to propose – at their 
own risk – comprehensive truths of the work29.
To conclude, we shall refer to another type of criti-
Boudon: The Point of View of Measurement in Architectural Conception 67
cism. Namely, the criticism which primarily, under the 
aegis of history, admits as a category of objects of stu-
dy, no longer the works but also the questions, met-
hods, approaches, techniques, and even concepts. In 
parallel to the theoretical work in the production of 
knowledge, its purpose would be to show how such 
knowledge can be given concrete form. In the scien-
tific field, these critical studies are classified among 
what is customarily called the history of sciences – re-
engaged in the project for a «stylistics» of a Granger30 –. 
From the moment that its contents are connected to 
the axiological activity of science itself. Can we ima-
gine that one of the effects of architectural research 
over and beyond the criticism of works or the history of 
doctrines might be to generate critical studies? Even 
if, as indicated by G. Canguilhem once again, «it is 
easier to be ironic on the importance attributed to 
concepts than it is to understand why, without them, 
there is no science»31, we must hope that the scientific 
production of architectural research will adhere to the 
critical perpective proposed above and to the produc-
tion of knowledge itself. Moreover, that may have al-
ready taken place without our having been fully aware 
of the development, in which case the remaining ques-
tion would be limited to establishing the individual 
boundaries of that which is of a scientific, epistemo-
logical, or an historical order.
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